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STATE JURISDICTION
OVER INDIANS IN INDIAN COUNTRY
MARVIN J. SONOSKY*
Prior to the coming of the white man, Indian tribes were sover-
eign in their own countries. The law of the tribe was the law of the
land. The tribe possessed all powers of self-government. After the
United States came into being, Indian tribes continued "as distinct,
independent political communities, . . ."' under the protection of
the federal government. Tribes lost their power to deal with other
nations, but they retained all other sovereign powers subject to the
legislative authority of the dominant sovereign.2 For all practical
purposes, as between state and tribe, tribal country was regarded as
if it were foreign soil.8 This inherent power of a limited tribal sov-
ereignty underpins the controlling principle, first laid down in Wor-
cester v. Georgia,4 that state jurisdiction does not extend to Indians
in Indian Country, except as authorized by Congress.2 The "...
basic policy of Worcester has remained'" although over the years
the broad applications flowing from that policy have been modififed.
Within this exception, Congress twice has enacted general legis-
lation subjecting Indians in Indian country to state jurisdiction,
7
once under Section 6 of the General Allotment Act of 18878 and again
* L.L.B., University of Minnesota, 1932. Mr. Sonosky represents the Standing Rock
Sioux Tribe of North and South Dakota, the Shoshoni Tribe of Wyoming, Assinaboin
and Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Reservation, Montana and others.
1. Worcester v. Ga., 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
2. Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 133-34 (10th Cir.
1959); F. COHEN, HAND3OOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (GPO 1945).
3. Worcester v. Ga., 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).
4. Id.
5. Warren Trading Post v. Ariz. Tax. Com., 380 U.S. 685, 687, n. 3 (1965); Wil-
liams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959) ; State ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683,
684 (9th Cir. 1969) ; CollIflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369, 374-376 (9th Cir. 1965);
Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 133-134 (10th Cir.
1959) ; Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89, 92, 94 (8th Cir. 1956); F. COHEN,
HANDBOOK OF FEDEaAL INDIAN LAW 122-126 (GPO 1945).
6. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959).
7. There may be local statutes relating to particular tribes or areas; these have
not been examined. See examples in F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 879
(GPO 1945).
8. Act of February 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 390 as amended by the Act of May
8, 1906, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182, 25 U.S.C. 349. Section 6 provided that after fee patents
issued, the allottees were to "be subject to the laws both civil and criminal, of the
State or Territory In which they may reside .... .. " To be precise, this language did
not extend state laws to allottees. Rather, the fee patent provision stripped the al-
lottee of the special status that barred state law from applying in Indian country.
Section 6 was "largely ineffective," mainly because the occasion for its use never
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under the Act of August 15, 1953, as amended.9 These acts must be
distinguished from statutes authorizing the administrative applica-
tion of state law by the Secretary of the Interior directly, or under
his aegis,10 and from statutes adopting as federal law the provisions
of state law.11
Absent superseding Congressional action, tribal sovereignty con-
trols. It confers on Indians in "Indian country" the right to be free
of state jurisdiction. The question is-what is "Indian country?" Be-
fore Congress defined Indian country in 1948, the federal cases gen-
erally defined "Indian country" to mean land to which the trust 2 or
restricted 8  Indian title had not been extinguished.14 But the incon-
sistencies and conflicts arising from court decisions 5 led Congress
to enact a statutory definition of "Indian country."
Except as otherwise provided in Sec. 1154 and 1156 of
this Title, the term 'Indian country' as used in this chapter,
means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reserva-
tion under the jurisdiction of the United States Government,
notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including
came to pass. The hope was that by the end of the 25-year trust period practically all
Indian land would be in fee status, there would be no Indian country and Indians would
be assimilated into the general population. This policy failed and the United States
continued to deal with the allottees as tribal Indians under federal supervision. Patents
in Fee, 61 I.D. 298, 302-304 (1954).
9. Act of August 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588, as amended, codified in 18 U.S.C.
1162 as to criminal jurisdiction and in 28 U.S.C. 1360 as to civil jurisdiction. Strictly
speaking, the 1953 Act is the only general statute where Congress acted to extend
state laws over Indians in Indian country. That Act is a unilateral effort to vest five
named states, and Alaska, later covered as a state by amendment, with civil and criminal
jurisdiction over Indians "in the areas of Indian country listed opposite the name of
the State" and offered the same jurisdiction to all other affected states that wished
to accept it regardless of the wishes of the Indians. With respect to the six named
states, it would seem that whether jurisdiction vested depends on whether such states
accepted Jurisdiction, either by affirmative action or by implication. Silas Mason Co.
v. Tax Comm. of Wash., 302 U.S. 186, 207 (1937) ; Fort Leavenworth R. a. Co. v. Lowe,
114 U.S. 525, 528 (1884). The 1953 Act was amended in 1968 to require Indian consent
by referendum. Act of April 11, 1968, Title IV, §§ 40-1-406, 82 Stat. 73, 78-80, 25 U.S.C.
1321-1326.
10. For example, the enforcement of sanitation and quarantine regulations, and with
the consent of the tribe, compulsory school attendance. Act of February 15, 1929, ch.
216, 45 Stat. 1185, as amended 25 U.S.C. 231.
11. For example, the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1970), adopting as
federal law the state law defining offenses not covered by federal law, if committed
in areas within federal jurisdiction, was extended to Indian country except as to of-
fenses by one Indian against another, or by an Indian punished by the law of the tribe,
or where the tribe has exclusive jurisdiction by treaty. 18 U.S.C. 1152 (1948). The Act
of March 29, 1956, ch. 107, 70 Stat. 62, 25 U.S.C. 483a, authorized mortgages of trust
land by individual Indians to be foreclosed "in accordance with the laws of the State
... " This did not extend jurisdiction to the state courts where the state had not ac-
cepted jurisdiction. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Deernose, 157 Mont., 487 P.2d 1133 (1971)
(Tribe sought to foreclose against an Indian mortgagor).
12. Title in the United States in trust for the Indian or the tribe. United States v.
Pelican, 232 U.S. 442, 449-450 (1914).
13. Fee title in the Indian or the tribe subject to restrictions against alienation im-
posed by federal law. United States v. Ramsey, 271 U.S. 467, 470-471 (1926).
14. United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535 (1938); United States v. Ramsey 271
U.S. 467, 470-471 (1926) ; United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442, 449-450 (1914) ; United
States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913) ; Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243
(1913) ; Clairmont v. United States, 225 U.S. 551, 557-559 (1912) ; Dick v. United States,
208 U.S. 340 (1908) ; United States v. Bris, 121 U.S. 278 (1887) ; Bates v. Clark, 95
U.S. 204, 207-208 (1877).
15. See reviser's note to 18 U.S,C, § 1151 (1970).
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rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all de-
pendent Indian communities within the borders of the United
States whether within the original or subsequently acquired
territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of
a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to
which have not been extinguished, including the rights-of-way
running through the same. 16
The opening exception in Section 1151, effectually extends state
liquor laws to fee-patented lands within non-Indian communities in
Indian country, and to rights-of-way through Indian reservations.T
Passing Clause (a), Clause (b) relating to dependent Indian com-
munities, seldom called into play, is derived from United States v.
McGowan,' Clause (c) concerning allotments is fairly obvious. 9
Clause (a) contains the controversial phrase, "Indian reserva-
tion." The cases usually arise out of a claim of jurisdiction under
state law over an Indian on nontrust land within the exterior bounds
of an area that at some time in the past was established as an In-
dian reservation. State law does not apply unless the reservation has
been disestablished or the reservation status otherwise dissolved by
Congressional action.
2 0
The original Indian reservations were large blocks of land held
in beneficial tribal ownership. In the early years these reservations
were greatly reduced in size by outright cessions and sales to the
United States. 21 Commencing around 1890 and continuing until the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,22 the policy of the United States
was to "break up reservations, destroy tribal relations, settle Indians
upon their own homesteads, incorporate them into the national life,
and deal with them not as nations or tribes or bands, but as indi-
vidual citizens. ' 23 This was accomplished in part by issuing allot-
ments that ultimately passed into non-Indian hands by sale or inher-
itance, but mainly by dividing a portion of the tribal land into
allotments, reserving small acreages for Indian schools, religious and
administrative purposes, purchasing sections 16 and 36 of each town-
16. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 757, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970).
17. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1154:
(c) The term "Indian Country" as used in this section does not Include fee-
patented lands in non-Indian comunities or rights-of-way through Indian
reservations, and this section does not apply to such lands or rights-of-way
in the absence of a treaty or statute extending the Indian liquor laws there-
to. June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 758; May 24, 1949, ch. 189, § 27, 63
Stat. 94.
18. United States v. McGowan, 202 U.S. 535 (1938).
19. United States v. Jewett, 438 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1971) held that a trust allotment,
to which no fee Patent had ever Issued, was Indian Country.
20. Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
21. For examples, see F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 294-295, ns. 64, 67
(WOPo 1945).
22. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 4,8 Stat. 984, as amended, 25 U.S.C. 461, et. seq.
23. Commissioner of Indian Affairs Report, 1890, p. VI.
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ship or lieu lands from the state for common schools, and treatng
the remaining tribal lands as surplus to the needs of the Indians.
Following the usual pattern, the United States either bought the
"surplus" land from the tribe for an agreed consideration (outright
sale and cession), or entered into arrangements referred to as "sur-
plus land" statutes, or "sessions in trust." Under these arrangements
the United States, sometimes unilaterally, and sometimes with tribal
consent, by statute ordered the surplus land sold to settlers under the
public land laws, 24 or by statute, confirmed tribal agreements, con-
taining the usual broad language of cession and surrender of title.2 5
In both instances, the statutes specified that the United States was
not a purchaser but was acting simply as trustee to sell the land
and credit the proceeds to the tribe. These arrangements are refer-
red to as "surplus land" statutes or "cessions in trust."
The policy of destroying tribal relations via the allotment route
continued until reversed in the early 1930's when allotments were
halted, new reservations were created, and lands were added to ex-*
isting reservations . 2  The sale of "surplus lands" was suspended and
in 1934, the "surplus lands" remaining undisposed of were restored
to the tribes on 33 reservations.
2 7
Through the years preceding the shift in policy, non-Indians had
established themselves on Indian reservations. Counties, towns, and
school districts were organized under state law within the reserva-
tion bounds. Non-Indians resented the immunity of their Indian neigh-
bors from state law. They were particularly vexed with the tax ex-
emption of Indian trust property. 28 Conflicts inevitably resulted.
24. E.g. :
North Dakota. Standing Rock-Act of May 29, 1908, ch. 218, 35 Stat. 460; Act of Feb-
ruary 14, 1913, ch. 54, 37 Stat. 675 ; Fort Berthold--Act of June 1, 1910, ch. 264, 36 Stat.
455. South Dakota. Pine Ridge-Act of May 27, 1910, ch. 257, 36 Stat. 440; Rosebud-
Acts of April 23, 1904, ch. 1484, 33 Stat. 254; March 2, 1907, ch. 2536, 34 Stat. 1230;
May 30, 1910, ch. 260, 36 Stat. 448; Cheyenne River-Act of May 29, 1908, supra Standing
Rock-Acts of May 29, 1908, supra, and February 14, 1913, aupra; Lower Brule-Act of
April 21, 1906, ch. 1645, 34 Stat. 124. Montana. Fort Peck-Act of May 20, 1908, CI. 237,
35 Stat. 558; Flathead-Act of April 23, 1904, ch. 1495, 33 Stat. 302. Washington Gol-
vile-Act of March 22, 1906, ch. 1126, 34 Stat. 80, interpreted In Seymour v. Superin-
tendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962) ; Spokane-Act of May 29, 1908, ch. 217, 35 Stat 458.
25. E.g., Act of January 14, 1889, ch. 24, 25 Stat. 642 (Chippewas In Minnesota)-
"complete cession and relinquishment . . . of all their title and Interest." Under this
act each of the Chippewa bands did "hereby grant, cede, relinquish and convey to the
United States all our right, title and Interest" Interpreted In Morrison v. Work, 266
U.S. 481, 483 (1925). Act of April 23, 1904, oh. 1624, 33 Stat. 852 (Crow Tribe, Montana)
- "cede, grant and relinquish . . . all right, title and Interest .... " Interpreted in Ash
Sheep Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 159 (1920).
Treaty of May 6, 1854, 10 Stat. 1048 (Delaware Tribe) - "cede, relinquish and quitclaim
. . . all their right, title, and Interest .... ".Interpreted in United States v. Brindle,
110 U.S. 688, 693 (1884).
Agreement modified and confirmed by Act of April 27, 190.4, ch. 1620, 33 Stat. 819
(Devils Lake, North Dakota) - "cede, surrender, grant, amd convey . .. .
Agreement modified and confirmed by Act of March 3, 1905, oh. 1452, 33 Stat. 1016.
(Wind River, Wyoming) - "hereby cede, grant, and relinquish . . . all right, title, and
Interest .... " Interpreted in State of Wyoming v. Moss, 471 P.2d 333, 336 (Wyo. 1970).
26. See Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 72 (1962).
27. Restoration of Lands Formerly Indian to Tribal Ownership, 54 I.D. 559 (1934).
28. States are prohibited from taxing Indian trust property. See eg.g., the Enabling
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Analysis discloses that the conflict of jurisdiction cases arise in
three different reservation situations. In each, the site in controversy
is fee land 29 within an area at one time established as a reservation.
In the first, the land never was acquired by the United States or
affected by a cession in trust. It remains "Indian country."8' 0
In the second situation, the land was sold by the tribe and pur-
chased by the United States. The tribal title is extinguished, the res-
ervation dissolved. The fee land is not "Indian country." 81
In the third situation, the fee land is located within a reservation
affected by a "surplus land" statute or a "cession in trust." In test-
ing whether the situs is "Indian country," the federal courts follow
the precept that when "Congress has once established a reservation,
all tracts included within it remain a part of the reservation until
separated therefrom by Congress.
'8 2
The landmark case is Seymour v. Superintendent"8 where the
Supreme Court considered a surplus land statute. In Seymour the
State of Washington convicted an Indian of burglary committed on
fee land in a state municipality on the south half of the Colville
Indian Reservation, affected by a 1906 "surplus land" act directing
the Secretary of the Interior "to sell or dispose of unallotted lands
in the diminished Colville Indian Reservation. '8 4 The state court
denied the Indian's petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground
that the situs was not an "Indian reservation" within the meaning
of 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (a) and therefore was not "Indian country." 5
The Supreme Court reversed. It applied the doctrine of United
States v. Celestine"8 to test whether the surplus land statute express-
ed a Congressional intent to disestablish the reservation. To ascer-
tain the intent of Congress, the Court examined the surplus land
statute in the light of the background of the reservation, the legis-
Act of North and South Dakota, Montana, and Washington, Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, §
4, 25 Stat. 676.
29. If It were trust or restricted land it would be "Indian country" under Section
1151(c) and there would be no dispute. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970).
30. Beardslee v. United States, 387 F.2d 280 (8th Cir., 1967); Sigana v. Bailey, 282
Minn. 367, 164 N.W.2d 886 (1969) (Red Lake); State of Minnesota v. Lussier, 269
Minn. 176, 130 N.W.2d 484 (1964) (Red Lake); Valdez v. Johnson, 68 N.M. 476, 362
P.2d 1004 (1961) (Pueblo); Pourier v. Board of County Com'rs. Shannon Co., 83 S.D.
235, 157 N.W.2d 532 (1968) In re Hankins Petition, 80 S.D. 44, 125 N.W.2d 839 (1964).
81. Ellis v. Page, 351 F.2d 250 (10th Cir. 1965) ; DeMarras v. State of South Dakota,
819 F.2d 845, 846 (8th Cir. 1963) ; Kain v. Wilson, 83 S.D. 428, 161 N.W.2d 704 (1968);
Wood v. Jameson, 81 S.D. 12, 130 N.W.2d 95 (1964); State v. DeMarrias, 79 S.D. 1,
107 N.W.2d 255 (1941), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 844.
32. United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 285 (1909), quoted with approval In
Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 359 (1962).
3. Seymour v. Superintendent, 868 U.S. 351 (1962).
34. Act of March 22, 1906, ch. 1126, 34 Stat. 80. The original Colville Reservation was
carved out of the public domain by Executive Order. The tribe had no compensable
title in that reservation. Ute Indians v. United States, 330 U.S. 169, 179 (1947) ; Sioux
Tribe v. United States, 316 U.S. 317 (1942). In 1892 Congress restored the north half to
the public domain. Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 355-356 (1962). The 1906
surplus land act recognized title to the south half in the Colville Tribe and at the same
time allotted and opened the south half for the sale of surplus land.
85. Seymour v. Schneckloth, 55 Wash.2d 109, 346 P.2d 669 (1959).
86. United States v. Celestlne, 215 U.S. 278 (1909).
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lative history of the statutes affecting the reservation and the tribe,
the administrative treatment of the area affected by the surplus land
statute, and the relevant federal policy. The Court could not find
where Congress had dissolved the reservation. The Court's review
led it to the conclusion that the purpose of the surplus land statute
"was neither to destroy the existence of the diminished Colville In-
dian Reservation nor to lessen federal responsibility for and juris-
diction over the Indians having tribal rights on that reservation. The
Act did no more than open the way for non-Indian settlers to own
land on the reservation in a manner which the federal government,
acting as guardian and trustee for the Indians, regarded as bene-
ficial to the development of its wards. 13 7 In other words, the Act
was not designed to destroy the reservation status, but was intended
to permit non-Indian settlers to live among the Indian allottees, so
that the latter might learn from their white neighbors.
Since Seymour, two cases have come before the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in which the situs was land
affected by a surplus land statute.38 In Miner an Indian pleaded
guilty to a state offense committed on fee land in a town on a
portion of the Cheyenne River Reservation in South Dakota affected
by a surplus land act.39
The Indian's appeal raised an issue of constitutional law con-
cerning the right to counsel at the sentencing. The question of whether
the situs was within the jurisdiction of the state was not reached
because it was not raised below.4 0 Circuit Judge Lay, in his dissent,
indicated that the state had the obligation to establish jurisdiction
before putting a person on trial and suggested that the "state 'guess-
ed' wrong concerning its jurisdiction." 41 The dissent expressed the
view that the Seymour decision provided a basis for strong argument
that the land affected by the 1908 surplus land act did not lose its
reservation status.
4 2
In City of New Town, North Dakota, the same court of appeals
held that the state's jurisdiction did not extend to Indians in a city
organized under state law located on a portion of the reservation af-
fected by the Fort Berthold surplus land act.
43
The state decisions do not lend themselves to uniform analysis.
Where state jurisdiction has been challenged, there seems to be a
reluctance to acknowledge the controlling principle of Seymour v.
87. Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 356 (1962).
38. City of New Town, North Dakota v. United States, 454 P.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1972)
United States ex rel. Miner v. Erickson, 428 F.2d 623 (8th Cir. 1970).
39. Act of May 29, 1908, ch. 218, 35 Stat. 460. The same act affected land on the
Standing Rock Reservation in both South Dakota and North Dakota.
40. United States ex rel. Miner v. Erickson, 428 F.2d 623, 628 (8th Cir. 1970).
41. Id. at 637.
42. Id. at 637-639, n. 11.
43. Act of June 1, 1910, ch. 264, 36 Stat. 455, listed In note 24, aupra.
556
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Superintendent. Some state courts explain Seymour by equating the
broad language of divestiture of title in the surplus land statutes with
the Seymour restoration of the north half of Colville to the public
domain.44 These cases do not distinguish surplus land statutes from
outright sales extinguishing Indian title.4 5
There is a distinction and the status of land as Indian country
may not be correctly reached without recognizing the distinction. To
be sure, the surplus land statutes generally direct the Secretary of
the Interior to "sell and dispose of" the surplus lands,48 while the
cessions in trust employ even broader language of divestiture of
title. 4T However, the law is established that it does not matter how
broad, clear and exhaustive the words of conveyance. While an out-
right purchase by the United States destroys the tribal title and the
reservation status, under a surplus land statute or cession in trust,
the United States does not purchase. The proceeds of sale are paid
to the tribe and beneficial title remains in the tribe until final dis-
position to the entryman or other purchaser.4s
It does not follow that every area affected by a surplus land act
or cession in trust continues as an Indian reservation. But, the an-
swer cannot be reached without examination of the applicable legis-
lation, its history, the background of the reservation, and the treat-
ment of the area by federal agencies to find whether Congress in-
tends to disestablish the reservation. This is the approach of the Su-
preme Court and the federal courts of appeals.
Jurisdiction is a definitive thing. Certainty is an essential ele-
ment. If it is correct that state law does not extend over Indians
in Indian country, except as authorized by Congress, jurisdiction
should depend solely on whether the situs is Indian country, assum-
ing no Congressional authorization. Recent state decisions would
make state jurisdiction depend on whether the extension of state jur-
isdiction over Indians in Indian country would interfere with the
tribe's autonomy or self-government.49
44. See note 34 supra.
45. State ex rel. Swift V. Erickson, 82 S.D. 60, 61, 141 N.W.2d 1, 2 (1966); State
v. Barnes, 81 S.D. 511, 137 N.W.2d 683, 684 (1965) ; Lafferty v. State, 80 S.D. 411, 416,
125 N.W.2d 171, 174 (1963) ; State ex rel. Hollow Horn Bear v. Jameson, 77 S.D. 527,
95 N.W.2d 181 (1959) ; State v. Moss, 471 P.2d 333, 336 (Wyo. 1970), where the court
could find no parallel between the Wind River surplus land act and the 1906 surplus
land act In Seymour.
46. See note 24 eupra.
47. See note 25 supra.
48. Morrison v. Work, 266 U.S. 481, 483 (1925); Ash Sheep Co. v. United States,
252 U.S. 159 (1920) ; United States v. Mille Lae Band, 229 U.S. 498 (1913) ; Minnesota
v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 394-395 (1902) ; United States v. Brindle, 110 U.S. 688, 693
(1884) ; City of New Town, North Dakota v. United States, 454 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1972) ;
Ellis v. Page, 351 F.2d 250, 252 (10th Cir. 1965); Hanson v. United States, 153 F.2d
162, 163 (10th Cir 1946).
49. Commissioner of Taxation v. Brun, 286 Minn. 43, 174 N.W.2d 120 (1970);
County of Beltrami v. County of Hennepin, 264 Minn. 406, 119 N.W.2d 25, 31 (1963)
McClanahan v. State Tax Commission, 14 Ariz. App. 452, 484 P.2d 221 (1971), appeal
dooketed, No. 71-834, 40 U.S.L.W. 3322 (U.S. Dec. 23, 1971) ; State of Montana ex rel.
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Under County of Beltrami,50 the Minnesota Supreme Court denied
aid to the dependent children of a poor Indian on the Red Lake Res-
ervation, undisputedly Indian country, on the ground that extending
the "poor-laws" of the state to Indians on the reservation would in-
terfere with tribal administration of a welfare program, and because
the state believed that it would have no jurisdiction to enforce
state "poor-laws." Consistently, under Commissioner of Taxation v.
Brun5 1 the Minnesota Supreme Court did not impose the state tax on
income earned by Indians on the Red Lake Reservation on the ground
that to do so would interfere with tribal self-government.
The Arizona Supreme Court, on the other hand, in McClanahan
v. State Tax Commission, 52 did not agree with the Minnesota Su-
preme Court. It held that the collection of state income taxes from
Indians on the Navajo Reservation, undisputedly Indian country, was
"not an infringement of the right of self-government by the tribe.
" 5 In State of Montana ex. rel. Kennerly v. District Court,54
the Supreme Court of Montana defined the "crux" of the case
as whether the tribal council's effort to transfer civil jurisdiction
to the state " 'infringe[d] on the right of reservation Indians to
make their own laws and be ruled by them' . . . .,55 It thought not.
The state courts find support for the interference test in dictum
in Organized Village of Kake v. Egan.5 8 There the court rejected the
Indians' claimed right to fish salmon with traps, holding that the In-
dians had no reservation and no property right to -fish by trap, that
the Secretary of the Interior was not empowered by Congress to vest
them with such a right, and that Alaska had not disclaimed juris-
diction under the Statehood Act.
The Supreme Court reviewed the few decisions of the court "as
to the power of the states when not granted Congressional authority
to regulate matters affecting Indians."57 Those decisions simply con-
firmed state jurisdiction over non-Indians and non-Indian affairs in
Indian country in situations where no Indian or Indian interest was
affected.5 8 It was in the context of its review of those decisions that
Kennerly v. District Court, -Mont.-, 466 P.2d 85 (1970), reversed 400 U.S. 423
(1971).
60. County of Beltrami v. County of Hennepin, 264 Minn. 406, 119 N.W.2d 25 (1963).
51. Commissioner of Taxation v. Brun, 286 Minn. 43, 174 N.W.2d 120 (1970).
52. McClanahan v. State Tax Commission, 14 Ariz. App. 452, 484 P.2d 221 (1971),
appeal docketed, No. 71-834, 40 U.S.L.W. 3322 (U.S. Dec. 23, 1971).
63. Id. at 457; 484 P.2d at 226.
54. State of Montana ex rel. Kenneriy v. District Court, -Mont.-, 466 P.2d 85
(1970), reversed 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
55. Id. at 90.
56. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
57. Id. at 74.
58. New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496, 499 (1946); Thomas v. Gay,
169 U.S. 264 (1898) ; Utah & Northern By. Co. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885) (property
of a non-Indian subject to state taxation); United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621
(1882) (state jurisdiction extends to crimes committed by one non-Indian against
another) ; Langford v. Monteith, 102 U.S. 145 (1880) (state Jurisdiction extends to civil
suits between non-Indians).
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the Supreme Court expressed the dictum on which state courts rely
for making state jurisdiction dependent on whether tribal self-gov-
ernment is affected. The Court stated:
These decisions indicate that even on reservations state
laws may be applied to Indians unless such application
would interfere with reservation self-government or impair
a right granted or reserved by federal law. 9
The jurisdictional test of tribal autonomy employed by the state
courts cannot be reconciled with the sovereignty doctrine on which
tribal freedom from state jurisdiction rests. Any action by one sov-
ereign (the state) that impinges on the sovereign powers of another
(the tribe) necessarily interferes with the right of the Indians to gov-
ern themselves and with the authority of Indian governments over
their reservations.
6o
The dictum in Village of Kake does not innovate a departure
from the sovereignty principle first announced by Chief Justice Mar-
shall 140 years ago in Worcester v. Georgia .61 State jurisdiction over
Indians in Indian country cannot be dependent on what each state
court conceives to be interference with tribal self-government. Such
an approach serves only to confuse, and to aggravate the jurisdic-
tional problems.
The following summary may be helpful in testing whether a par-
ticular site is Indian country under 18 U.S.C. § 1151:
1. If the situs is trust or restricted property, regardless of
whether it is in a reservation, it is Indian country, including rights-
of-way running through it.
2. If the situs is fee land or a right-of-way, within a reserva-
tion never sold to the United States and-never affected by a "sur-
plus land" statute or "cession in trust," it is Indian country.
3. If the situs is fee land, within the boundaries of a reservation
that was sold outright by the tribe to the United States, it is not In-
dian country.
4. If the situs is fee land or a right-of-way, within the bound-
aries of a reservation affected by a "surplus land" statute or a
"cession in trust," it is Indian country, in the absence of a clear
Congressional intent to the contrary.
59. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 869 U.S. 60, 75 (1962).
60. Worcester v. Ga. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
61. Id. at 559.

